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AN ANALYSIS OF
SECTION 129 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
D. B.
NATURE OF SECTION

129:

CHASE

PRE'VENTION OF

TAX

AVOIDANCE

Section 120 of the Internal Revenue Code, enacted as part of Section 128
of the Revenue Act of 1943, is concerned with those acquisitions of control
of corporations or of corporate property which are made primarily for the
purpose of evading or avoiding income or excess profits tax by a distorted
use of various provisions of the tax law.
The Section first appeared in Section 115 of the Revenue Bill of 1943, as
it was introduced into the House of Representatives by Chairman Doughton
of the Ways & Means Committee. It was retained by the Finance Committee,
with amendments, and formed part of Section 122 of the Revenue Bill of
1943, as it was presented to the Senate by Chairman George of the Finance
Committee. The Section underwent minor changes on the Senate floor and
was sent to the Conference Committee as part of the bill. It emerged in
Section 128 of the bill which was subsequently enacted into law.
The history of the Section reveals that "evasion" was not originally contained therein, but was first injected by the Finance Committee.1 The Conference Committee retained it in view of its use elsewhere in the code, and
to make clear that the result denoted in Section 129 by "evasion or avoidance"
is that which would be referred to in ordinary usage either as "evasion"
or as "avoidance", including cases not cognizable under the criminal or administrative penalty provisions of law.2 Presumably it was the intention of
Congress to avoid any niceties of definition, and to reach all the tax-reducing
transactions which violate the policy of the Section, regardless of nomenclature.3
In order to more fully appreciate the position of this new Section in our
1
FINANCE
2

CommrrTEE REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 59.
CoNFERENCE COMITTEE REP. No. 1079, 78th Congress, 2nd Sess. (1944)

55; U. S.

Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.129-1 (b) states that the phrase "evasion or avoidance" is not limited
to cases involving criminal penalties, or civil penalties for fraud.
$Professor Powell stated in an address delivered before the American Law Institute
that he finds "definitions difficult to frame and substantially useless when framed." 11
PROCEEDINGS OF AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 122 (1933).
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tax structure, it is first necessary to examine the inroads which had already
been made on tax avoidance prior to the enactment of Section 129 and the
course of events which led to this legislation.
PRIOR STATUS

OF TAX

AvoIDANCE-JUDICIAL INROADS

4

In Gregory v. Helvering, the Supreme Court stated that: ". . . The legal
be his
otherwise
right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what would 1
.
taxes, or altogether a-void them by means which the law permits, cannot be
" However, in construing the phrase "means which the law
doubted ...
permits," 5 the Court in the same case determined that a transaction which
fell within a provision of the law, but not within its basic policy, would
not be recognized. In other words, on being confronted with a transaction
motivated solely by the desire to reduce taxes, the Court was not satisfied
with mere literal compliance 6 with the statute. The Gregory case involved
a statutory reorganization which, although fitting within the phraseology of
the statute, had no purpose other than to camouflage the payment of a dividend. Although the case has been widely criticized, 7 it represents a wideawake attitude of the courts to the problems of tax avoidance.
In Griffiths v. Helvering,s the Supreme Court again refused to recognizea corporation which had been created for the sole purpose of avoiding taxes.
The taxpayer anticipated the receipt of money which he believed would constitute taxable income to him. To avoid taxes, he caused a wholly owned corporation to be formed and caused the corporation to receive the money in
question. The Court, recognizing why the corporation was created, "pierced
4293
U. S. 465, 55 Sup. Ct. 266 (1935), aff'g 69 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
5
"The expression 'by means which the law permits' opens up a field of inquiry." Larkin
v. 6United States, 78 F. (2d) 951, 954 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
The doctrine of the Gregory case, however, is not applicable if the transaction is in
substance what it appears to be in form. Chisholm v. Comm'r, 79 F. (2d) 15 (C. C. A.
2d, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 641, 56 Sup. Ct. 174 (1935) ; Humphreys v. Comm'r,
88 F. (2d) 430 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937); Morsman v. Comm'r, 90 F. (2d) 18 (C. C. A. 8th,
1937); Continental Oil Co. v. Jones, 26 F. Supp. 694 (N. D. Okla. .1939); Clara M.
Tully Trust, 1 T. C. 611 (1943) ; John D. McKee, 35 B. T. A. 239 (1937) ; 1937-1 Cum.
BULL. 15; W. P. Hobby, 2 T. C. 980 (1943). If the intermediary corporations in the
Gregory case were more than mere "paper" corporations, the reorganization would
probably have been recognized. Chisholm v. Comm'r, supra. The mere desire to avoid
taxes is insufficient alone to condemn a transaction. See the cases cited in this footnote,
7 and the Gregory case.
Hendricks, Developments in the Taxation of Reorganizations (1934) 34 COL. L. R-v.
1198, 1207; Satterlee, The Income Tax Definition of Reorganization (1934) 12 TAX
MAG. 639; MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK, 1934-35, 176; MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL
INCOME TAX HANDBOOK, 1935-36, 184; Seidman, The Gregory Reorganization Case
(1935) 13 TAx MAG. 130.

8308 U. S. 355, 60 Sup. Ct. 277 (1939), aff'g 103 F. (2d) 110 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
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the corporate veil" and taxed the entire proceeds to the taxpayer. Relying
on Lucas v. Earl,9 the Court declared that taxes cannot be escaped "by
anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised . . . by

which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they
grew."
The Supreme Court refused to tolerate the type of avoidance which was
present in Higgins v. Smith.10 There the taxpayer sold securities to a corporation, wholly owned by himself, at a loss, for the sole purpose of getting
a present deduction. The Court sustained the Commissioner's refusal to
allow the- loss deduction to the taxpayer, regarding the transaction in the
light of taxpayer's continued control as involving "no transfer at all." In
other words, as the Court said, there was simply "a transfer by Mr. Smith's
left hand, being his individual hand, into his right hand, being his corporate
hand, so that in truth and fact, there was no transfer at all," rather than a
transfer "out of Mr. Smith and into something that existed separate and
apart from him." This doctrine has recently been reiterated by the Tax
Court in Crown Cork International Corporation v. Commissioner,"1 where
a parent corporation tried to deduct a loss sustained on the sale of securities
to a wholly owned subsidiary. Section 24(b) was not applicable to the year
involved in the Smith case, and did not include the transfer involved in the
Crown Cork case. Thus, on the basis of established case law, the Tax Court
disallowed the loss deduction.
The Griffiths and Smith cases should be distinguished from cases like
Moline Propertiesv. Commissioner,12 where there was a real business reason
for forming the corporation and, also, where it was to the Government's
advantage to recognize the existence and separateness of the corporate
entity.Y8
928 1 U S. 111, 50 Sup. Ct. 241 (1930) ; Note (1930) 43 HAL L. REV. 1282.
10308 U. S. 473, 60 Sup. Ct. 355 (1940). Fundamentally, this case involved the difficult problem of the extent to which the tax law will recognize transactions between a
corporation and its stockholders. In this respect, see the opinion in the recent case of
National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F. (2d) 466 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944), in which this
broader problem is discussed in terms of Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co.,
287 U. S. 415, 53 Sup. Ct. '198 (1933); Higgins v. Smith, 102 F. (2d) 456 (C. C. A.
2d, 1939), rev'd 308 U. S: 473, 60 Sup. Ct. 355 (1940); Moline Properties, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 319 U. S. 436, 63 Sup. Ct. (1943); and Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465,
55 Sup. Ct. 266 (1935).
114 T. C. -, Docket No. 1004, Sept. 21, 1944.
12319 U. S.436, 63 Sup. Ct. 1132 (1943).
' 3 See also Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U. S. 415, 53 Sup. Ct. 198
1933) and Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm'r, 319 U. S. 590, 63 Sup. Ct 1279 (1943).
In Gutbro Holding Co. v. Comm'r, 138 F. (2d) 21 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943), judge Chase
said: "As I understand the law, in transactions between a sole shareholder and his
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Finally, we have J. D. & A. B. Spreckels Co. v. Commissioner,14 a case
more similar in nature to the type of transaction which gave rise to Section
129. There, a corporation purchased the stock of another corporation for
the sole purpose of taking advantage, via consolidated returns, of the depreciation in value of the subsidiary's principal asset. After the purchase of
the subsidiar r for a nominal sum, the asset was sold and a large loss
realized. The Court refused to permit the loss to be used by the purchasing
corporation, via consolidated returns. It decided that the affiliation in question did not serve -abusiness purpose, as distinguished from a tax-reducing
purpose, and that the acquired company was not affiliated and could not be
included in the consolidation. On the theory that the legislators did not
intend, in permitting consolidated returns, that the privilege be enjoyed in
cases where the affiliation relied upon as the basis for the privilege to make
a consolidated return is without a business purpose, the Court refused to
permit consolidated returns to be filed. It held that the privilege of filing
consolidated returns was granted in order that the tax liability of a group
of corporations which were combined for business purposes into one business unit might be based on the same net income of .the business unit. It
concluded that: "The same general problem of statutory construction, which
is involved here, was involved in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465. The
Supreme Court held in the Gregory case that a 'letter perfect' reorganization which served no business purpose was not within the intent of the
reorganization exemption provisions of the statute. In this case, we find
a parallel. The affiliation in question, although 'letter perfect,' served no
business purpose, and it does not, in our opinion, come within the intent of
the affiliation provisions of the statute."
Although the Spreckels case merely represents a decision of the Board
of Tax Appeals, it is a good indication of the present judicial attitude with
respect to tax avoidance. That is, the courts are prepared to scrutinize and
defeat certain transactions which are purposeless beyond their effect to
reduce taxes. Such being the case, Section 129 was perhaps unnecessary. It
was the opinion of many tax practitioners 15 that the.Spreckels case was the
forerunner of a host of decisions which would prove that the practice of
buying up corporate shells or property for tax avoidance purposes was just
corporation the Treasury has the choice of treating them as real or as fictitious. Burnet
v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U. S. 415; Higgins v. Smith, 308 U. S. 473."
1441 B. T. A. 370 (1940).
15
WAYS AND ME.ANS CommirrEE REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 24;
FiNANCE CommiTrmE REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 26.
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another neat trick that didn't work. However, for reasons to be set forth
later, the Section was enacted, approving the Spreckels decision as one of
the principles established by judicial decisions, having that effect of preventing the avoidance of taxes which the Section is intended to codify and
emphasize. 16
PRIOR STATUS OF TAX AVOIDANCE-STATUTORY INROADS

In addition to the implications of the preceding line of cases, the limits
of which are still uncertain, also in effect prior to the enactment of Section
129 are various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code which are designed
to prevent specific types of avoidance otherwise having statutory sanction.
It is interesting to speculate, with respect to some of these provisions, to
what extent the courts would have reached the same result in the absence
of specific legislation.
First is Section'45, which, in effect, prohibits tax avoidance by the distortion of income or deductions between separate, but related, organizations.
The Commissioner is authorized to re-allocate income or deductions between
such organizations so as to prevent avoidance, or to more clearly reflect the
income of each organization. The Section recognizes the possibility of manipulation between related organizations, even within the language of the statute,
so as to give a most advantageous tax result to the entire group. An example
7
of the application of the Section is' found in the Natioial Securities case.'
There the taxpayer was a subsidiary corporation. Its parent had purchased
1,000 shares of stock for about $140,000.00. The stock had declined in value
to about $8,000.00. The parent then transferred the 1,000 shares to it, for
its stock, in a tax-free exchange. Subsequently, the taxpayer sold the shares
for about $7,000.00 and tried to deduct the $133,000.00 loss. He relied particularly on Sections 112 and 113 to sustain the deduction. However, the
Court held that: "Section 45 is directed to the correction of particular
situations in which the strict application of the other provisions of the act will
result in a distortion of the income of affiliated organizations. In every case
in which the section is applied, its application will necessarily result in an
apparent conflict with the literal requirements of some other provision of
the act. If this were not so, section 45 would be wholly superfluous." As a
result, the Court affirmed the decision of the Board which permitted the
Commissioner to reallocate the loss on the sale between the parent and the
16
WAYs AND MEANS CoiM
rrEE REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 49;
FINANCE COMi TTEE REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 58.
17137 F. (2d) 600 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943), cert. dended, 320 U. S. 794, 64 Sup. Ct. 262 (1943).
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taxpayer, that is, $132,000.00 (the difference between basis and the fair
market value at the time of transfer to the subsidiary) to be deducted by the
parent, and $1,000.00 to be deducted by the taxpayer (the difference between the fair market value when acquired and the selling price).
In addition, there is Section 24(b) which enacts and extends the doctrine
of Higgins v. Smith 8 by disallowing losses between certain related taxpayers, and Section ,24(c) which prevents such taxpayers from avoiding taxes
by taking advantage of their different methods of accounting.
Then we have Sections 102 and 500 which are designed to prevent avoidance of tax on stockholders ,of a corporation by the unreasonable accumulation of earnings and profits in the hands of the corporation. These Sections
are, by their -very nature, applicable to close corporations. They strike at the
practice of stockholders' avoiding income tax by causing the corporation to
accumulate earnings and profits in years in which the stockholders have
much other income, or in which tax rates are high, and'to declare dividend
distributions of earnings and profits in years in which tax rates are low,
or in which the stockholders have losses or little income from other sources.
Again, there is the provision in Section 112(k). This Section was enacted
in the 1939 Revenue Act to overcome the effect of United States v. Hendler49
wherein it was, decided that the assumption of liabilities in an otherwise
non-taxable reorganization exchange was the equivalent of the receipt of
cash or other property by the corporation whose liabilities were assumed,
thus making the gain, if any, from the exchange, recognizable to the extent
of the amount of the liabilities so assumed. Section 112(k) provides that the
assumption of liabilities, or the taking of property subject to them, in connectiol with Section 112(b) (4) or (5) transactions, shall not be considered
as "other property or money" receivedby the taxpayer, and shall not prevent
the transaction from being tax-free. However, to prevent its abuse, the Section goes on to say "that if, taking into consideration the nature of the liability and the circumstances in the light of which the arrangement for the
assumption or acquisition was made, it appears that the principal purpose of
the taxpayer with respect to the assumption or acquisition was a purpose to
avoid federal income tax on the exchange, or; if not such purpose, was not a
bona fide business purpose, such assumption or acquisition (in the amount
38308 U. S. 473, 60 Sup. Ct. 355 (1940).
19303 U. S.564, 58 Sup. Ct. 655 (1938), rehearing denied, 304 U. S. 588, 58 Sup.
Ct. 940 (1938), rev'g 91 F. (2d) 680 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937), which aff'd 17 F. Supp.
558 (D. Md. 1936).
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427

of the liability) shall, for the purposes of this Section, be considered as
20
money received by the taxpayer upon the exchange.
Also, we have the various basis provisions which prevent avoidance, or
hardship in some cases, by providing for continuity of basis in certain taxfree exchanges; and Sections 115(g) and 112(c) which treat as dividends,
distributions which are essentially equivalent to dividends, but which appear
to be distributions in cancellation and redemption of stock, or "boot" in a
tax-free exchange; and Section 115(h) which provides that non-taxable distributions of stock, property, or money shall not be deemed to reduce corporate earnings and profits; and Section 118 which disallows losses from
sales or exchanges when the vendor repurchases, shortly after the sale, "substantially identical stock or securities" to those sold.
Finally, there are some important changes in regulations, with respect to
consolidated returns, which were promulgated by the Treasury Department 1
and approved on March 14, 1944. Although approved subsequently to the
enactment of Section 129, they are here classified as a prior inroad on tax
avoidance because they appear to apply to taxable years starting with 1943
rather than 1944, even though they were issued on next to the last day for
filing returns for the calendar year 1943. Also, they properly fall together
with the other incursions on tax avoidance which have just been mentioned
and which may be availed of by the Commissioner when Section 129 is.
unavailing.
The new Treasury Decisions have apparently been promulgated to reach
transactions in which affiliated groups are formed at any time after March 14,
1941, or in which new subsidiaries become members of the group after that
date. Presumably, March 14, 1941, was chosen because it is the date on
which the consolidated excess profits tax regulations, under Section 730 of
the code, were first issued. The purpose of the changes is, broadly speaking, to prevent the use, by the acquiring corporation or group, of losses or
excess profits credits of a subsidiary acquired after March 14, 1941, and to
prevent the application of the losses or excess profits credits of the acquiring corporation or group to the income of a subsidiary acquired after such
date unless, in either case, and to the extent that, the Commissioner determines that the allowance of the loss or credit will not distort the excess
profits tax liability of the group.
20
For a very informative discussion of this section, as it corrects the unfortunate situation created by the Hendler case, and as it protects itself from avoidance, see S. S.
Survey, The Revenue Act of 1939 and the Assumption of Indebtedness on Tax-Free
Exchanges
(1940) 50 YALE L. 3. 3.
21
T. D. 5340 and 5341, 1944 INT. Ray. BuLL. No. 6, at 9, 11.
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The new Treasury Decisions go a long way in eliminating the type. of
avoidance which Section 129 is designed to reach and, in some respects, are
even broader in scope. The most noticeable difference is their failure to
require the existence of an avoidance purpose, although the Commissioner
presumably should consider this factor in determining whether allowance of
the loss or credit will distort the group's excess profits tax liability. It
would seem that the effect of these changes can be avoided, in certain cases,
by a tax-free liquidation under Section 112(b) (6), although the lateness
of their issuance prevented this result for 1943 in those cases where the acquired corporation was unfortuitously kept apart.
Thus we see that even prior to the enactment of Section 129, a substantial
body of law had developed to combat avoidance, that is, the reduction of
taxes through transactions which had the favor of fitting within the technical
framework of the tax law.
NEED FOR SECTION

129

With the enactment of the Excess Profits Tax on October 8, 1940, the
problem of tax avoidance became more acute. Taxpayers craved certainty,
wishing to know to what extent they could avail themselves of the literal
provisions of the statute to avoid taxes, but the only answer was the nega"tive statutory warnings and the Gregory v. Helvering22 line of decisions.
Despite these red lights, many corporations, faced with the highest tax rates
ever imposed in the history of this country, decided to go ahead. They acquired corporations or corporate property, using appropriate sections of the
Internal Revenue Code to the hilt, in order to get the benefit of depreciation
deductions, losses in value, and past, present or future net operating losses,
excess profits credits, and unused excess profits credits of other corporations.
In many of these transactions, no pretense was even made at business purpose, the taxpayers relying on the fact that they had brought themselves
within the letter of the statute and so were entitled to prescribed allowances.
On the other hand, many reputable attorneys were advising their clients not
to indulge in such acquisitions since they believed that the courts would
interpret present law so as to deprive them of the tax advantage which they
hoped to derive. 23
To protect the revenue, 24 to put an end to the market for interests in cor22293 U. S. 465, 55 Sup. Ct. 266 (1935), aff'g 69 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
23
WAYS AND MEANS CommInE REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 24;
FINANCE COMMITTEE REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 26.
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porations and corporate property which has tax avoidance as its purpose,2
to give honest taxpayers and practitioners assurance that they were not
going to be discriminated against in favor of tax dodgers, 26 and to permit
honest taxpayers and practitioners to continue to conduct their affairs and
business in the ordinary way without fear that they would bear a tax burden
which others similarly situated would escape,2 7 Congress enacted Section
129 in the Revenue Act of 1943. In opposition to this legislation, it was
urged that the general principle of striking down purely tax avoidance
transactions had already been established and that the proposed statute was
merely a restatement of existing law, 28 but the pressure for such legislation
and the outrageous character of the transactions which had been called to the
attention of the members of Congress, made the legislation a foregone conclusion.
NATURE AND SCOPE OF SECTION

129

Section 129 applies to acquisitions of corporations or of corporate property,
made on or after October 8, 1940, for the principal purpose of evading or
avoiding federal income or excess profits tax by securing the benefif of a
deduction, credit, or other allowance which would not otherwise be enjoyed.
It does not take the form of a general anti-avoidance statute. Rather, it is
aimed directly at the type of transaction which gave rise to its existence,
that is, acquisition of interest in corporations or property which have as
their objective the reduction through artifice of the income or excess profits
tax liability.2
Although aimed at specific types of avoidance, Congress deemed it wise
that the Section should not be confined to a description of any particular
methods for carrying out such avoidance, 30 but should include within its
scope these devices in whatever form they might appear. It was believed
that any attempt to encompass tax evasion and avoidance problems by a
specific description of the tax avoidance schemes would catch within its net
both intended transactions and those not intended, and would fail to catch
some of those intended to be caught, in addition to catching those not so
24

WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st
FINANCE COMMITTEE REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943)

Sess. (1943) 24, 49-50;

26.

25bid.
26Ibid.
271bid.
28
Hearings before Finance Committee on H. R. 3687, 78th tcong., 1st Sess. (1943) 826.
29
WAYS AND MEANS Coinu=!TTEE REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 49.
30
The section was criticized in this respect. Hearings before Finance Committee on
H. R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 593, 611.
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intended. 31 It was also thought that the specific description would tend to
center attention upon the form and technical character of the scheme, and
32
let the substance of the tax avoidance escape.
Fundamentally, the purpose of the Section is to prevent taxpayers from
reducing their tax liabilities by distorting or perverting various sections of
the tax law.33 The distortion or perversion referred to consists of the abuse
of various provisions of the law, such as Sections 112, 113, and 141, which
were enacted to remove impediments from the bona fide conduct of business
in the ordinary way. It is the use of these Sections to get the benefit of deductions, credits or allowances which the taxpayer would not be entitled to
in the normal conduct of its business, rather than for the purpose for which
the Sections were enacted, which constitutes the abuse, distortion, and per34
version which Section 129 is designed to end.
To illustrate, B is a typical defunct or deficit corporation with past losses,
fixed assets with book values highly in excess of market values, and an
invested capital with large offsetting deficits, etc. As such, the law permits
B to carry over its past losses as offsets against its present profits,-5 to
compute depreciation 6 and loss from disposition of assets37 on the basis of
the book value of its assets, to carry over its past unused excess profits
credits88 for the purpose of determining present war excess profits, to compute its invested capital credit on the basis of the amount originally invested without any reduction for past deficits, etc.8 9 All these advantages
depend upon B's making profits. But B, for war or other reasons, is on the
way out. It is failing, if it hasn't already failed. Neither B nor its stockholders are able to take advantage of all these allowances, which would
enable the recovery of a large amount of profits tax-free. The tax law
intended these advantages for B to permit B to recoup itself.
By abusing various provisions of the tax law, however, these benefits
could be secured by an outsider for whom they were never intended. For
example, A is a highly successful corporation with large profits. A is in a
position to use B's offsets, although they were never intended for A. A
contacts B's stockholders and offers to buy their stock at a price which
31

FINANCE COimImTTE REP.

32Ibid.
23
4

No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 60.

WAYS AND MEANS CoAimirrrB

REP. No.

S FiNANCE CominTTEE REP. No. 627, 78th
3INT. REv. CODE §§ 23(s) and 122 (1939).
3 6
3 7

1NT. REV. CODE §

SSINT. REV. CODE
39

114 (1939).

(1939).
§ 710(c) (1939).
§ 718 (1939). 1

INT. REV. CODE § 111(a)
1NT. REV. CODE

871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943)
Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 59.

49.
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reflects the tax advantages which A will receive from owning the stock.
Then A liquidates B tax-free, 40 and gets the basis of B's assets for the purpose of determining loss, depreciation, and the 'excess profits credit. 41 Even
better, A could have had its stockholders acquire B's stock and then con42
tribute the stock in A to B. B could then liquidate A into B tax-free,
in which case all of B's allowances would come to the benefit of A, including net operating losses and unused excess profits credits of former years.
Or, instead of liquidating A, the corporations could file consolidated returns, 43

and thus many of B's advantages could be used by A. The multifarious ways
in which the various sections of the tax law could be perverted to get undue
advantages will best be illustrated when the devices actually contrived
before the enactment of Section 129 come before the courts.
Considering the nature and purpose of the Section, there can be no doubt
that that it will be construed liberally to include transactions which violate
its underlying policy. In any event, the joy of not fitting within the Section
may be short lived if the transaction in question abuses its policy. The Section, in effect, codifies and emphasizes the general principle set forth in the
several Supreme Court and other judicial decisions as to the ineffectiveness
of certain arrangements which have no purpose other than tax avoidance by
the misuse of various provisions of the tax law. 44 Congress believed that the
Section would more effectively secure its objectives if its scope were limited
to cases in which the control of a corporation or corporate property was acquired on or after October 8, 1940, since such acquisitions are clearly those
in which the opportunities for distortions and perversions are largest, both
in method and result. 45 It assumed, 46 however, that the older types of avoid-

ance scheme which are excluded from the scope of Section 129, if not within
the scope of Section 45, will be governed by the principles which have been
stated judicially. The Conference Committee clearly expressed 47 its desire
that the circumstance that specific categories of tax avoidance or evasion
are selected for specific statutory treatment for taxable years beginning
after December 31, 1943, should not be treated as abridging, restricting, or
limiting the full application of any applicable law or rule of law, whether
40

INT. REV. CODE § 112(b) (6) (1939).
REV. CODE §§ 113(a) (15), 718, 760, and 761 (1939).
1NT. REV. CODE § 112(b) (6) (1939).
43
INT. REV. CODE § 141 (1939).
44
FINANCE COMMITrEE REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943)
45
41
INT.
42

Ibid.
46Ibid.
47

CONFF.RENCE Co

iiii1

58-59.

REP. No. 1079, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1944) 55.
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explicit or implicit, in the code, or in judicial decisions, whether as yet
applied to particular situations or as yet decided. It stated, also, that as.
respects any taxable year beginning before, on, or after January 1, 1944,
the Section should not be read as approving or validating by inference, implication, or otherwise, any tax avoidance or evasion device, action, or result,
whether within or without the categories of the Section, or as diminishing
in any manner the efficacy of any law or rule, of law in the prevention of
distortions or perversions. Thus, a transaction which does not fall within
Section 129 may still be attacked under existing law, the principles of which
have been reinforced by their adoption in Section 129.48

It may be argued that in an important respect, Section 129 goes even
further than the established principles which it purports to codify. Perhaps
under existing law it is not necessary that a business purpose be the dominant
reason for the transaction in question. On the other band, Section 129 in
effect requires that the principal purpose of the deal is a business purpose.
It is believed that the courts will look for the same kind of proof whether
a transaction is sought to be condemned under Section 129 or judicial law.
However, once the courts have the taste of the new Section they may be
more apt to condemn even less flagrant transactions.
PROSPECTIVE OPERATION

Section 1'29 is only applicable to taxable years beginning in 1944 or thereafter, and the determination of the law applicable to prior taxable years
must be made as if it had not been enacted and without inferences drawn
49
from the fact that it is not expressly made applicable to prior taxable years.
When the Section first passed the House, it was made retroactive to all
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1939.50 The thought of the Ways
and Means Committee was that the provision deals with devices which have
always been palpable tax-dodging schemes, the legality of which was questioned from the beginning. 51 By making the Section retroactive, it was the
intent of the Committee to avoid giving approval, even by implication, to
any tax-dodging schemes already in operation. Before the Finance Committee some witnesses argued 52 that the retroactive feature was unfair, that,
48U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.129-2.
49
Revenue Act of 1943, § 128(c).
50
Revenue Bill of 1943, H. R. 3687, § 115, as introduced into the House.
51
WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 24.
52
Hearingsbefore the Finaiwe Committee on H. R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943)
592, 594.
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if the devices, are illegal under the law. existing prior to 1944, it should be
so determined under that law. With respect to the approval, by implication,
of previous tax-dodging schemes, should the provisions be made to operate
only prospectively, it was urged that it could be declared specifically that the
new provision should not be deemed to imply any approval of such schemes
or to affect the decision of their legality under existing law. 3 Although the
Finance Committee retained the House provision, despite this criticism, a
floor amendment in the Senate restricted the operation of the Section to only
taxable years beginning in 1944 or thereafter. As enacted, the prospective
feature was retained, but with an amendment avoiding approval, by implication, of the legality of any schemes under prior law.54 The Conference
Committee stated its intention 55 that tax administration for prior taxable
years should proceed upon the basis that existing law is fully operative.
ANALYSIS OF THE SECTION

The two types of acquisitions to which Section 129 applies are:
(1) acquisitions, direct or indirect, of control of a corporation by any
person or persons; and
(2) acquisitions by any corporation, direct or indirect, of property of
another corporation, the basis of which property, in the hands of the
acquiring corporation, is determined by reference to the basis in
the hands of the transferor corporaton, prozided that the acquiring
corporation or its stockholders did not control, directly or indirectly, immediately prior to such acquisition, the transferor corporation.
An Acquisition
For Section 129 to apply, there must first have been an "acquisition."
This is because the type of avoidance which the Section is designed to eliminate involved an "acquisition" of a corporation or of corporate property.5 6
Although "acquisition" is not specifically defined, 57 a broad construction
is likely where the transaction in question violates the underlying policy
of the Section. Presumably, "acquisition" includes transfers by way of gift
or inheritance. For example, a taxpayer might ask his wife to buy up the
stock of a defunct corporation and make a gift of the stock to the taxpayer's
53Hearings before the Fifiance Committee on H. R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943)
611.
54
!Revenue Act of 1943, § 128(c).
55
CONFERENCE Co0nmrI=E REP. No. 1079, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1944) 55.
56
WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE RE'. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 49.
57
The term is discussed by Randolph E. Paul in the third series of his Studies it Federal Taxation, pp. 63-65, in connection with reorganizations.
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corporation. The latter could then effect a tax-free liquidation under Section 112(b) (6). Or, he might have her make a gift of the stock to him,
so that he could contribute it to the capital of his corporation. The corporation would then liquidate, the subsidiary, as above. Again, the taxpayer might
be acquainted with a person who owns a defunct corporation. The latter
might, make a gift of his stock to the taxpayer or the taxpayer's corporation so that the losses and unused credits of the defunct corporation could
be availed of. Of course, the donor might be related to the donee-taxpayer
or, if unrelated, the donor might receive some benefit from the donee, such
as a job in the latter's business. These illustrations may or may not seem
remote, but they do serve the purpose of pondering upon the potential application of Section 129. "Acquisition" includes gift or inheritance receipts for
the purposes of other provisions of the code, and presumably the same result
would be reached here. If the transaction "distorts or prevents the natural
business relationship between a deduction or credit and the enterprise which
produced it," Section 129 might well be held to apply.
Does "acquisition" include the commencement of a business in corporate
form? Although the formation of a corporation does result in the acquisition of control of a corporation, it is believed that Congress did not intend
to take away the right, of taxpayers to choose any form that they may desire
for the conduct of business. 58 Certainly that is not what prompted the legislation to be enacted. For the same reason, it is believed that the statute
does not apply to persons who incorporate'a going business. Nor should it
make any difference that the purpose to reduce taxes was uppermost in the
minds of the incorporators.
On or After October 8, 1940
The condemned acquisition must have taken place on or after October 8,
1940. This is the date of the enactment of the Second Revenue Act of 1940,
which embodied the wartime excess profits tax, after which date the crux
of the flagrant avoidance devices which give rise to Section 129 took place. 59
Of course, any acquisition or other transaction occurring prior to this date
would be subject to the application of other provisions of the law. 60
5
SHearings before the Finance Committee on. H. R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943)
46, testimony of Randolph E. Paul, then General Counsel of the Treasury: "The amendment in no way abridges the privilege of doing business in individual partnership, or corporate form, or the privilege of filing a separate or a consolidated return, or any of the
numerous choices which the structure of the tax system is intended to afford."
59
49.
60 WAYs AND MaNs COmmiTTEE REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943)
FINANCE CommiTTEE REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 58-59; CoNFERENCE
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Of Corporate Property or Control
'The acquisition, on or after October 8, 1940, must be either of control of
a corporation, or of property of a corporation not controlled by the acquiring
corporation immediately prior to the acquisition.
"Control," 6 ' for this purpose, is specifically defined 62 as the ownership
of stock possessing at least 50 per cent of the total combined voting power
of all classes of stock entitled to vote, or at least 50 per cent of the total
value of shares of all classes of stock of the corporation.0 3 Since the definition reads in the disjunctive, Section 129 would apply to a case in which
50 per cent or more of the voting power was held prior to October 8, 1940,
but 50 per cent more of the total value of the stock was not acquired until
after that date, or vice versa. However, it does not apply to cases in which
the acquiring person or corporation owned, before October 8, 1940, at least
50 per cent of the voting power and at least 50 per cent of the total value
of the stock of the acquired corporation, or of the corporation whose property
was acquired. Nor does it make any difference that the percentage of control is increased after that date. That is, if 50 per cent control exists before
October 8, 1940, it is of no consequence that complete control is subsequently
acquired.
Section 129 does not contemplate that the stock constituting the 50 per
cent control was all acquired after October 8, 1940.64 Thus, if A owns 40 per
cent of the stock of corporation X on October 7, 1940, and acquires on
October 8, 1940, an additional 10 per cent of such stock, a vulnerable "acquisition" is made by A on October 8, 1940.
A difficult problem of valuation may arise, in determining whether control
exists, as a result of the provision that the ownership of stock possessing at
least 50 per cent of the total value of shares of all classes of stock may constitute control. For example, in Section 501 (a) (2), relating to personal
holding companies, a similar test exists for purposes of the "stock ownerCommrrr REP. No. 1079, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1944) 55; U. S. Treas. Reg. 111,
§ 29.129-2.
G'The-term
is discussed by Paul in op. cit. supra note 57, at 74-75.
02
When introduced into the House, the Bill contained no definition of "control."
The Finance Committee defined "control" as meaning "more than 50 per cent." FIxANCE
Co.mrir REPORT No. 627, 78th Cong., lst Sess. (1943) 58. The present definition
resulted from further clarification in conference. CONFERENCE Commx=TEE REPORT No.
1079,
78th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1944) 17.
63
1NT. REv. CODE § 129(a) (1939).
64
CON
CE CommTIamE REP. No. 1079, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1944) 17; also,
U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.129-1(d).
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ship" requirement. There, the regulations 65 suggest that the phrase "in
value" shall, in the light of all the circumstances, be deemed the value of the
corporate stock outstanding at such time, not including Treasury stock.
This value is to be determined upon the basis of the company's net worth,
earning and dividend paying capacity, and appreciation of assets, together
with such other factors as have a bearing upon the value of the stock."6
If, however, the value of the stock is greatly at variance with that reflected
by the corporate books, the evidence of such value is required to be filed
with the return. Where there are two or more classes of stock outstanding,
the total value of all the stock must be allocated among the different classes
according to the relative value of each class therein. Presumably, for the
purpose of Section 129, the same factors affecting "value" may have to be
sifted. Of course, it is presumed that 50 per cent of the value of stock
refers to only outstanding stock, as is the case with comparable provisions
in Section 24(b) (1) (c) and Section 501(a) (2).
Since the ownership of stock determines control, it is important to ascertain
to what extent the ownership of stock may be imputed to a particular taxpayer. No comparable provision being included, it mutst be assumed that
constructive ownership rules such as those found in Sections 24(b) and 503 do
not apply here. In other words, in determining whether a taxpayer owns
50 per cent of the stock, stock held by his family or partner, or by a corporation, partnership, estate or trust, of which he is a stockholder, partner or
beneficiary, respectively, or by a stranger subject to an option to acquire by
the taxpayer, or by members of his family, would not be considered as owned
by the taxpayer, without more.67 Of course, under certain circumstances,
68
stock may be deemed to be owned by the taxpayer "indirectly."
The Section does not apply to mere shifts in the form of control.69 In
65U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.501-3.

66 1n Jenkins v. Smith, 21 F. Supp. 251, 253 (D. Conn. 1937), the Court quoted from
Professor R. T. Ely, Outlines of Economics, p. 223, to the effect that "The price or
value that might be expected to obtain rests upon opinion and judgment. No more tangible or definite basis can be found. Valuations, like demand and supply curves, are of
the stuff that dreams are made of,-judgment, opinion, forecasts, of the future. Upon
such
67 foundations rests the modern business world."
See A. G. Nelson Paper Co., Inc., 4 T. C. -- Docket No. 1553, Aug. 30, 1944,
organizations . . . owned or condealing with similar language under section 45: "...
trolled directly or indirectly by the same interests. .. ." Where a husband and wife
each controlled a separate corporation, one corporation leasing property from the other,
the husband and wife were not deemed to have the "same interests," the stock of the
wife not being imputed to the husband.
6sSee
notes 81 through 83 infra, and the related material in the text.
69
FNANCE COmmiTTEE REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 60.
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other words, a mere shift in the form of control from direct to indirect, from
indirect to direct, or from dne form of indirect to another form of indirect,
cannot amount to the acquisition of control within the meaning of Section
129. For example, if a controlled or affiliated group existed on October 8,
1940, transfers thereafter within the group would not amount to the acquisition of control by the parent or its controlling interest. Thus, control once
acquired could not be again acquired, unless the group is in some way broken.
A transfer within a controlled or affiliated group frequently occurs by a
Section 112(b) (6) liquidation or by a tax-free exchange under the reorganization or consolidated returns provisions of law. While a Section
112(b) (6) liquidation would change the form of control into a more direct
form, it would hardly result in acquisition of control ° under Section 129.71
Transfers within a controlled or affiliated group under the reorganization or
consolidated returns provisions of the law are more often than not precisely the same as Section 112(b) (6) liquidations in this respect. In either
case, there is merely a shift in the form of control.
Suppose, however, that instead of shifting the stock of a subsidiary nearer
the parent, as in Section 112(b) (6) liquidation, it is transferred farther
down the chain of subsidiaries. In that case, the subsidiaries farther down
72
the chain do acquire control of the shifted subsidiary under Section 129.
However, with respect to the parent or the subsidiaries farther up the chain,
there is merely a shift in the form of control. For example, if A Corporation
owned B Corporation prior to October 8, 1940, at which time B Corporation owned C Corporation, A has indirect control of C. The subsequent
liquidation of C into B, making A's and B's control of C more direct, does
not fall within the Section. Or, if in the above illustration B also controlled
D Corporation, the transfer by B to C of D's stock does not constitute a new
acquisition of control by A or B. However, in the latter case there is an
acquisition of control within the Section by C of D.
70A liquidation cannot occur under section 112(b)

(6) unless there is an 80% con-

trol of the liquidated corporation. If this 80% control exists, there exists also control
(for the purpose of section 129) of each corporation of which the liquidated corporation
71 owned an interest of 50% or more.
As it passed the House, section 129 was sufficiently broad to include section
112(b) (6) liquidations. But strong opposition of leading tax practitioners before the
Finance Committee caused it to be changed to exclude such transfers. See the testimony of Harry J. Rudick and of Ellsworth C. Alvord, respectively in the Hearings
before
the Finanwe Committee on H. R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 463 and 593.
72
FINANqCE COmmiTTEE REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 61.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 30

Split-ups
It may be feasible for a large corporation to split-up into several smaller
corporations in order to get the benefit of a $10,000.00 specific exemption
for excess profits tax purposes for each corporation. Does Section 129 apply
to such a split-up ?
Although the regulations reply affirmatively, 73 it is believed that Section 129
74
does not include and is not intended to include split-ups.

In order for Section 129 to embrace split-ups, they must come within
the language of the statute. The statute 75 requires that the acquiring corporation secure the benefit of an allowance which it would not otherwise
enjoy. In the case of a split-up, it is the subsidiary which gets the additional
allowance, and not the acquiring corporation. However, the parent does
benefit indirectly and, therefore, Section 129 should be construed broadly
to include split-ups if it is found that Congress intended this result. It is
my opinion that this result was not intended.
In 1934, Congress was confronted with a situation in which there had
been, after October 8, 1940, wholesale acquisitions of corporations and corporate property for the purpose of reducing taxes. The acquisitions involved
situations where persons or corporations went outside of themselves to purchase corporations or corporate property to improve their tax position. R
was this "market" which had developed, for interests in corporations or
76
corporate property, for tax purposes, which Section 129 was designed to end.
It is clear, therefore, that a split-up is not the kind of transaction comprehended under Section 129.
The basic distinction between the transaction which Section 129 is intended to discredit and the split-up is that in the former case the corporation
goes beyond itself in its dealings, whereas the latter situation merely involves
an internal reorganization. Only the former, transaction serves to distort
or pervert the natural business relationship between a deduction or credit
and the enterprise which produced it.77 The split-up merely represents an
exercise of the right to do business in any form, 78 the form of control being
73U.
S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.129-3.
74
The following material merely represents my argument on a much debated subject
among tax practitioners. Of course, since the validity of the regulations is now in issue,
as 7a5 practical matter my position is considerably weakened.
Section 129 requires that a "person . . . acquire . . . control of a corporation ...
securing the benefit of a . . . allowance which such person . . . would not otherwise
enjoy.
....
6

"

7 WAys AND M AXS CommrTrEE REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 24, 49;
Hearings before the Finance Committee on H. R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 45.
77Ibid.; FINANCE COmmiTTEE REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 45.
7Slbid.
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changed from direct to indirect. It is in effect a transfer within a controlled
or affiliated group.79
It might be noted in this respect that a great incentive for the corporate
split-up has come from a provision in the very Act of which Secion 129 is
a part, that is, the provision increasing the specific exemption for excess
profits tax purposes from $5,000.00 to" $10,000.00. Also, that the Section is
not so worded as to defeat any transaction which is motivated by the desire
to reduce taxes by getting an allowance which would not otherwise be
enjoyed. Rather, it is directed solely and specifically at the two types of
acquisitions which had been so flagrant since October 8, 1940, that is, acquisitions of corporations and of corporate property. 0
Directly or Indirectly
It makes no difference that the acquisition of control or of property, on
or after October 8, 1940, is indirect. For example, the result is the same
if the taxpayer acquired control of, or property directly from, a third corporation, or if the taxpayer enjoyed effective control or ownership by having
a subsidiary make the acquisition. On the other hand, if indirect control
or property ownership existed prior to October 8, 1940, the subsequent shift
in the form of control or ownership does not constitute a violation 'of the
8
statute. '
It was suggested, previously,8 2 that control means stock ownership and
that the rules of constructive ownership found elsewhere in the code do not
apply here. Certain cases of constructive ownership under Sections 24(b)
and 503, however, would properly be treated as indirect (actual) ownership
under Section 1,29. For example, a taxpayer would probably be held to own,
indirectly, stock held by a corporation which he owned, or a proportionate
share of stock held by a corporation or partnership of which he was a
stockholder or partner. On the .other hand, in the absence of manipulation,
a taxpayer would probably not be treated as the indirect owner of stock held
83
by his wife.
70
WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 24, 49;
Hearingsbefore the Finance Committee on H. R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 45;
FINANCE COMMITTEE REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 60.
800f course, a decision that split-ups are not comprehended within section 129 might
in the same breath be accompanied by the holding that the split-up in question offends
established case law and so must be disregarded.
81
See notes 69 through 72 szupra, and the related material in the text.
92See note. 67 supra, and the related paragraph in the text.
83
See A. G. Nelson Paper Co., Inc.; 4 T. C. -, Docket No. 1553, Aug. 30, 1944. The
tax law is still many light years away from recognizing the oneness of the family unit.
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By Any Person or Persons, or Corporation
Again, it has been suggested8 4 that two types of acquisitions fall within
Section 129: first, acquisitions of control of a corporation; secondly, acquisitions of property of a corporation. But, whereas the Section includes
acquisitions of control of a corporation by "any person or persons," defined
in the Internal Revenue Code Section 3797(a) (1) to include individuals,
partnerships, or corporations, it includes acquisitions of property of corporations made only by corporations. This difference is consistent with the type
of avoidance which the Section is designed to reach. Whereas this type of
avoidance could be accomplished by the acquisition or control of corporations by individuals or corporations, it could only be achieved by the corporate acquisition of the property of other corporations. This is because the
heart of the acquisition of corporate property as an avoidance device is
the retention of the transferor's basis of the property. The latter result can
only be achieved, within the framework of the code, by a corporate acquisition.
"Persons," presumably, includes acquisitions by partners or joint owners,
acting jointly, and also acquisitions by previously unassociated persons. For
example, A, B, C, and D may be partners in a business. They acquire X, a
defunct corporation, for the purpose of securing the benefit of X's losses.
Section 129 applies. But suppose A, B, C, and D are completely unrelated
and own, individually, successful businesses. They each acquire a specific
interest in X, less than 50 per cent for each, intending to contribute their
business to X's capital. Have "persons" acquired control within the meaning of the Section? Or, suppose A, B, and C have high-basis, low-value
properties, and D has a very profitable piece of property. They form X Corporation and transfer to it tax-free, their properties, for stock under Section
112(b) (5). Neither of them receives a 50 per cent stock interest. Are their
interests to be considered together, so that they meet the test that "any...
persons acquire" control of a corporation, for the purposes of Section 129?
Such would be the result under Section 112(b) (5). Since the new Section
is intended to be construed broadly, it will probably be interpreted to embrace
the aforementioned cases. It is believed that the failure to repeat "persons"
in the latter part of the Section8 5 is of no significance.
Of Corporate Property
Where the acquisition is one of corporate property, Section 129 requires
s4 See introductory material in the part of this article dealing with "Afialysis of the
Section,"
supra p
85
It reads "which such person . . . would not otherwise enjoy."
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that the basis of such property in the hands of the acquiring corporation be
determined by reference to the basis in the hands of the transferor corporation. It was suggested previously that this requirement exists because such
an acquisition would not otherwise create the type of avoidance, if any,
which the Section is meant to end. By acquiring the transferor's basis, the
acquiring corporation receives back tax-free more than it invested. But if
its basis is cost, it would receive back tax-free only the amount of its investment. In the latter case, there would be no perversion within the meaning
of the tax law and Section 129. For example, B Corporation is operating
at a loss. Its principal asset has a basis far in excess of its then market value.
B Corporation is willing to dispose of such property at a price which reflects
its market value, and is willing to take payment in voting stock of A Corporation. A, in high tax brackets, will have tax savings far in excess of
cost if it can take depreciation, or a loss, using B's basis of the property.
So A acquires the property from B in exchange solely for A's voting stock.
This is a tax-free exchange under Sections 112(b) (4) and 112 (g), so under
Section 113(a) (6) A may use B's basis for tax purposes. This acquisition,
being principally to avoid taxes, falls within Section 129.
In addition to the requirement of receipt of the transferor's basis, an
acquisition of corporate property is vulnerable under the Section only if the
acquiring corporation or its stockholders, immediately prior to such acquisition, did not control the corporation whose property it acquired. Congress
did not intend to affect transactions between related organizations, 6 believing that8 7 existing laws 8s was adequate to cope with avoidance in such cases.
Such transfers were literally within the Section as it first passed the House,8 9
but the Senate eliminated them from its scope in order to emphasize the
special function of Section 129, and the Conference Committee approved. 0
Where a corporation acquires property from a controlled corporation, but
corporate control "was acquired after October 8, 1940, the initial acquisition
is subject to attack under Section 129. However, if the initial acquisition of
8

6F1IANCE ColmsITrrEr REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 59-60.
FiNANCE Comamtra REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 58-59.
1NT Rzv. CODE §§ 45 and 141 (1939), and the regulations thereunder; also Higgins

87

88

v. Smith, 308 U. S. 473 (1940). Section 128 of the Revenue Act of 1943 also amended
section 45 of the Internal Revenue Code by enlarging the phrase "gross income or

deductions" to read "gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances." The purpose

was to clarify the scope of section 45 in existing law. Since section 129 was intended
not to overlap into the field of section 45, it was important that the intended scope
of section 45 be explicitly stated so as to prevent certain technical arguments against

the 9 inclusion of certain transactions.
S
Revenue Act of 1943, § 115(a).
90
CONFmENCE Co.imEfnT

REP. No. 1079, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1944)"54.
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control was not principally motivated by tax avoidance, the subsequent
transfer for the purpose of avoidance may not be impeached under Section 129,
since it falls into the excepted category of transfers between related corporations. Of course, the time lapse- between the acquisition of corporate control
and the subsequent intercorporate transfer of property will reflect on the
purpose for which corporate control was first acquired.
Suppose that there is an acquifition of property from a corporation which
controls, rather than is controlldd by, the acquiring corporation. Does the
Section apply? For example, A is the parent and B is the subsidiary. If A
liquidated B into A, the acquisition by, A of B's property would not be
subject to Section 129. But, instead, A contributes some property to the
capital of B. Section 129 does not apply if B or its stockholders controlled,
directly or indirectly, A. But B's stockholder is A, and thus we are reduced
to the question of whether A controls A. Rather than to attempt a play on
words, it is believed best to refer to the preceding material for the answer.
It was not the intent of Congress to affect dealings between related or affiliated organizations."i It was thought that 92 such transactions are already covered by the existing law 93 with'respect to avoidance. Consequently, it is
believed that Section 129 does not apply to the case in question.
The Section does not apply to an acquisition of property from a corporation already controlled by the acquiring corporation or its shareholders. Suppose, then, that A owns X Corporation and B owns Y Corporation. X desires to make use of Y's high-basis, low-value property. If X acquires the
property from Y for voting stock, the transaction is vulnerable. But, suppose
that B first buys absolutely a nominal amount of X's stock from A, thus
becoming a stockholder of X, and X then acquires the property from Y for
voting stock. The transaction then seems to fall outside of the Section since
"immediately prior to such acquisition" by X, Y was controlled by X or its
stockholders. Of course, it might still be attacked under established cases
if not under Section 129' In fact, the acquisition by B of stock in X, for
the sole purpose of avoiding the Section, might well be the death blow in
fitting the basic transaction within Gregory v. Helvering.94 Of course, if B
99 12 FINAXCE CoifMMI"TrEE REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943)
FINANCE COmm'rTEE REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943)
COvmriTTEE
REP. No. 1079, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1944) 54-55.
93

59-60.
58-59; CONFERaNCE

1NT. REv. CODE § 45 (1939) ; National Securities Co. v. Comm'r, 137 F. (2d) 600,
cert. denied, 320 U. S. 794 (1943).
94308 U. S. 355 (1939), aff'g 103 F. (2d) 110 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939); although it is
believed that technically the Gregory case is not applicable, it is not yet known just
how far the doctrine of that case will be extended.
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were a 50 per cent stockholder of X for many years before, 95 the purchase
would have a better chance of surviving attack.
PrincipalPurpose
Whether the acquisition be of control of a corporation or of property of
a corporation, to be within Section 129, "the principal purpose" for which
such acquisition was made must be the evasion or avoidance of federal income
or excess profits tax by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit, or other
allowance which the acquiring person or corporation would not otherwise
enjoy.
As it passed the House, the Section engrossed transactions where "one of
the principal purposes" was avoidance. 96 But this provision was bitterly
attacked before the Senate Finance Committee9" on the ground that such
a provision would make any transaction vulnerable since a prudent business
man would, before entering into any transaction, first consider its tax consequences and try to effect the transaction in a way which would be as economical tax-wise as possible. Thus, they argued, it could be said that "one
of the principal purposes" in any such transaction was avoidance. As a
result, the provision was rephrased to include only transactions in which
"the principal purpose" is avoidance or evasion.
"Principal purpose" is a question of fact. The taxpayer has a negative
burden of proof in such a case. That is, it must be able to prove that the
"principal purpose" of the acquisition in question was not evasion or avoidance. Each case will depend on its own peculiar facts. The determination of
the purpose for which any acquisition was made, will necessarily require a
scrutiny of the entire transaction or course of conduct, with all its surrounding circumstances 5 Thus the taxpayer has the burden of tying all the facts
together in such a way as to prove that the "principal purpose" is not evasion
or avoidance:
The regulations"9 state that if the purpose to evade or avoid federal income
05See e.g., A. G. Nelson Paper Co., Inc., 4 T. C. -, Docket No. 1553, Aug. 30, 1944,
where the husband controlled X Corporation, in which the wife had a one-sixth interest,
and the wife controlled B Corporation.
96
Revenue Bill of 1943, § 115(a).
97
Hearings before the Finance Committee on H. R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943),
Mr. Alvord's brief on behalf of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, p. 611, and Mr. Chapman's brief on behalf of the Comptrollers Institute, p. 825.
9
SFINTANCE COmmITTEE REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 59. U. S. Treas.
Reg. 111, § 29.129-2 suggests that an important fact to be considered is conduct of the
business of the taxpayer." Of course, the "germane" test introduces another difficult
question of fact.
09U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.129-3.
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or excess profits tax exceeds in iniportance any other purpose, it is the
principal purpose. It is believed that the test must be a subjective one, to'
determine the factor which was most important to the taxpayer in causing
the acquisition. It is not difficult to imagine cases involving numerous
motivating factors, where it is impossible to conclude 'that any one reason
was the principal reason and where no one reason can propertly be regarded
as the "principal reason" or "last straw." It must, however, be constantly
remembered that the burden of proof is on the taxpayer.
If the taxpayer is able to show a more important reason for making the
acquisition than tax avoidance, he would seem to have met his burden. It
would probably be sufficient to prove that the acquisition would not have
been made but for the suggested business reason, the tax advantage being
considered only to the degree that any prudent business man would deem
wise. However, it is not necessarily sufficient to prove the converse, that
the acquisition would have been made'even if the tax reducing factor was not
present. 0 0 In the latter case, the tax reason could still be the principal one.
In the former case, the business reason is clearly most important.
The "principal purpose" may be a "business purpose," although the choice
of acquisitions is motivated primarily by tax avoidance. For example, A Corporation needs a factory. It can buy one of many, but buys for voting stock
the one with the highest tax base and lowest fair market value. Here the
"principal purpose" for the acquisition of one, as compared with another, is
taxes, but business reasons caused the acquisition in the first place. This
kind of transaction is more in the prudent man category than in the coldblooded avoidance class at which Section 129 was directed. Consequently, it
is not believed that the Section applies.
Again, suppose Mr; A wants to go into business. Taxes being too high,
he doesn't want to risk his capital. However, he finds an unsuccessful corporation which he wishes to develop because its excess profits credit is high
enough to assure no corporate excess profits tax liability. If he did not find
such a corporation, he would not go into business. This acquisition merely
assures a greater return after taxes. It is not believed that, in light of the
purpose of Section 129, it could successfully be argued that the principal
purpose for which such a~quisition was made is avoidance of a tax, regardless of the fact that no acquisition would have been made if Mr. A did not
find a corporation with a suitable excess profits tax base. The principal pur100TJ. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.129-3 provides that: "this does not mean that only
those acquisitions fall within the provisions of section 129 which would not have been
made if the
evasion or avoidance factor was not present."
I
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pose was a business purpose and Mr. A merely acted prudently. The answer
would probably be different if the corporation purchased was a defunct "empty
shell," not particularly suited to the purchaser's needs.
What about the defunct corporation that gets new capital and buys a
successful corporation only because its backers are aware of its large credit
and past losses. It is believed that such a transaction is not covered since it
involves only one acquisition, the principal purpose of which is a "business
purpose."''
It might be different if the defunct corporation were first purchased by new owners. In the latter case, two acquisitions would be involved, the first of which might well be for the "principal purpose" of avoiding taxes.
Federal Income or Excess Profits Tax
Section 129 is concerned with avoidance of "Federal income or excess
profits tax." The term "Federal income or excess profits tax" refers to any
federal tax imposed by Congress upon an income base. 0 2 Thus, the Section
includes acquisitions made for the purpose of avoiding any tax or combination of taxes in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of the code, including the normal
tax, surtax, Section 102 tax, personal holding company tax, declared-value
excess profits tax, and the excess profits tax.
Deduction, Credit, or Other Allowance
The avoidance contemplated by the Section is the enjoyment for tax purposes of the benefit of a "deduction, credit, or other allowance" which
properly belongs to another. The expression "deduction, credit, or other
allowance" has reference to any provision which has the effect of diminishing the tax liability resulting from the gross amount of any item of income
or the aggregate of the gross amounts of any or all items of income.10 3 Thus
it includes current, past, or prospective credits, deductions, net operating
losses, and unused excess profits credits.' 0 4
As the Section now reads, it includes only cases where the person or cor' 0oof course, it should be expected that the Government will invoke the "germane"
test, and argue that the business acquired is not "germane" to the activities of the
defunct corporation.
102 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.129-1 (c).
1'03WAYs AND MEANS 'ComiTmT REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1944) 49. U. S.
Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.129-(a) states that the term "allowance" includes "an adjustment,
an exemption, or an exclusion." Query whether the privilege afforded to Western
Hemisphere Trade Corporations (Int. Rev. Code §§ 15 and 107) constitutes an "allowance" under section 129.

104U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.129-3.
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poration making the acquisition secures the benefit of the deduction, credit,
or other allowance. Despite the absence of specific language, as contrasted
with other parts of the Section, presumably it makes no difference whether
the acquiring person or corporation secures the particular benefit "directly
or indirectly." For example, A has a successful business. He buys a defunct
corporation for a nominal sum and transfers the business to the defunct corporation, so that the latter's losses will offset the income of the business.
Since the corporation is a separate entity, A secures the benefit of its losses
only indirectly. Yet Section 129 was intended to apply to such a transaction
and, it is expected, will be so held to apply. As previously suggested, Congress intended a flexible statute, one which would be broadly construed, in
light of its underlying policy.' 0 5
Section 1,29 presumably applies whether the acquiring corporation is seeking to enjoy its own deduction, credit, or other allowance, or that of the
corporation or property acquired. For example, a prosperous corporation
may acquire a defunct corporation to avail itself of the latter's unused allowances. On the other hand, a corporation with unused credits or losses may
acquire another going corporation to make use of its own unused allowances.
In both cases, the effect is to secure the benefit of an allowance which would
not otherwise be enjoyed. In the former case, however, the "principal purpose" will usually be more obvious.'

0 6

Extent of Disallowance
Since Section 129 comprehends certain acquisitions whose principal purpose is avoidance by securing the benefit of an allowance which would not
otherwise be enjoyed by the one making the acquisition, the punishment meted
out is the disallowance of the allowance sought.
In order that the disallowance may be consistent with the purpose and
appropriate scope of the Section,' 07 the Commissioner is authorized' 08 (1) to
'allow any part of the amount otherwise disallowed, which is consistent with
the prevention of the avoidance for which the acquisition was made, and/or
(2) to allocate the gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances in such
No. 871, 78th Cong., Ist Sess. (1944) 49,
.. The scope of the terms used in the section is to be found in the objective of the
section, namely, to prevent the tax liability from being reduced through the distortion
or perversion effected through tax avoidance devices." At any rate, Higgins v. Smith,
30806U. S. 473, 60 Sup. Ct. 355 (1940), would probably be held to apply.
'1 7 In the latter case the "germane" test will probably be decisive.
0 WAYs AND MEANS CommirTTEE REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., Ist Sess. (1944) 49.
10
S1NT. REV. CODE § 129(b) (1939).
105WAYS AND MEANS CoMmITTEE REP.
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manner, between the corporations and properties involved, as he determines
will not result in the avoidance for which the acquisition was made. The
thought in the first case is to enable the Commissioner to reflect in the deductions, credits, and allowances the purchase in substance by the acquiring
interest.10 9 The second category provides for the more complex cases where
reflecting the acquisition in substance may require the allocation or distribution of a deduction, credit or allowance between or among the corporations
or properties involved. 110
The authority granted to the Commissioner is like that existing under
Sections 45 and 141.111 Consequently, his abuse of such authority should
similarly be subject to review and reversal. There is a difference in the manner in which the authority is given, but it is believed that such difference
is of no consequence. That is, under Sections 45 and 141 the Commissioner
is authorized to perform the positive act of reapportioning income and deductions. If he exercises such authority, in a proper case, it will be to the taxpayer's disadvantage. But under Section 129, the entire deduction, credit,
or allowance is first disallowed. Thus, if the Commissioner then exercises
his authority in a proper case, it is to the taxpayer's advantage. However,
as suggested before, the purpose of Section 129 is to be effectuated. So,
where a deduction or credit is disallowed entirely under Section 129 and the
Commissioner, in a proper case, does not restore part of the item disallowed,
this negative action will be subject to review for abuse of authority. For
example, if A Corporation acquired control of B Corporation for the sole
purpose of acquiring the benefit, through consolidated returns, of part of B's
excess profits credit, such part would be disallowed. But it would be a violation of Section 129, subject to review and reversal, for the Commissioner
to disallow the use of a portion of B's excess profits credit against B's
excess profits net income, and to carry backward or forward- the unused
portion of such credit.
In the case of an acquisition of corporate property, the Commissioner
would be required to treat the acquiring corporation at least as well as if
it bad purchased the property outright and no tax-free exchange were involved.11 2 In other words, the acquiring corporation is at least entitled to
10 9

FINANCE ComimTEE REP.

liOlbid.

No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st "Sess. (1943) 49.

"'Ibid .
L FINANCE CoifmIrrEE REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 61. ("Thus, the
consideration passing upon the acquisition or the income of the corporations or proper1 2

ties involved, both prior to and after the acquisition, may, in appropriate cases, be an
important factor in determining a proper credit, deduction, or allowance.")
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;cvmpute its invested capital credit or depreciation or loss on the basis of the
'fair market value at the time of the acquisition. For example, if A Corporation acquired for voting stock B Corporation's sole asset, having a basis
of $100,000.00 and fair market value of $10,000.00, A would be entitled to
have a basis of at least $10,000.00 allowed.
CONCLUSION

After considering the nature -of Section 129, no one can legitimately find
fault with its purpose or underlying policy. However, the great objection
to the legislation is the broad power which it gives the Commissioner. As
Mr. Alvord testified. before the Senate Finance Committee, it is "a general
power to haul in everything that the Commissioner might want to haul in."
But it must, in fairness, be remembered that the enactment of Section 45 was
objected tb for tlie same reason. Yet experience shows us that Section has
generally not been abused by members of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Let us hope that Section 129 will be handled the same way, not as a club to
force taxpayers into submission on other issues, but legitimately, to achieve
the object of preventing circumvention and distortion of the tax laws.

